Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Psychology Faculty Research and Publications

Psychology, Department of

4-2021

Having no Words for Feelings: Alexithymia as a Fundamental
Personality Dimension at the Interface of Cognition and Emotion
Olivier Luminet
UCLouvain

Kristy A. Nielson
Marquette University, kristy.nielson@marquette.edu

Nathan Ridout
Aston University

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/psych_fac
Part of the Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Luminet, Olivier; Nielson, Kristy A.; and Ridout, Nathan, "Having no Words for Feelings: Alexithymia as a
Fundamental Personality Dimension at the Interface of Cognition and Emotion" (2021). Psychology
Faculty Research and Publications. 497.
https://epublications.marquette.edu/psych_fac/497

Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Psychology Faculty Research and Publications/College of Arts and Sciences
This paper is NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION.
Access the published version via the link in the citation below.

Cognition and Emotion, Vol. 35, No. 3 (April 2021): 435-448. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis
(Routledge) and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette.
Taylor & Francis (Routledge) does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed
or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Taylor & Francis (Routledge).

Having no Words for Feelings: Alexithymia as
a Fundamental Personality Dimension at the
Interface of Cognition and Emotion
Olivier Luminet

Research Institute for Psychological Sciences, UCLouvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
Fund for Scientific Research (FRS-FNRS), Brussels, Belgium

Kristy A. Nielson

Department of Psychology, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI
Department of Neurology, Medical College of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI

Nathan Ridout

Department of Psychology, School of Life & Health Sciences, Aston University, Birmingham, UK

ABSTRACT
This special issue brings together two important reviews and seven cutting-edge empirical papers concerning
the influence of alexithymia on cognitive and emotional processing. Alexithymia is a multifaceted construct that
is characterised by difficulties identifying one’s feelings; difficulties describing one’s feelings to others; and an
externally focused, utilitarian cognitive style. In this paper, we begin by considering how emotion science has

evolved in its understanding of personality traits, before highlighting the potential importance of alexithymia
research for the field of cognition and emotion. After summarising the historical context of alexithymia research,
we consider the contributions of the featured papers to the literature of cognition and emotion. The collected
works highlight that alexithymia influences several aspects of how one perceives and responds to neutral and
emotional situations, by impacting upon multiple processes (attention, appraisals, memory, language and
behaviour), showing the importance of drawing better connections amongst multiple processes, toward
disentangling the effects of early processes on later ones. A lack of correspondence between processes, as well
as amongst alexithymia facets, is another central finding of the special issue. This pattern is thought to lead to
ineffective and inflexible emotion regulation and to pose significant risks for physical and mental illness.
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The field of cognition and emotion has led to major advancements in understanding the importance of
detecting, identifying, understanding, labelling and regulating emotions (see Koole & Rothermund, 2019). These
functions represent a complex interplay of developmental, experiential and cognitive processes that are
fundamental to adaptive individual and social functioning. As a complementary perspective, the study of
disruptions of emotion processing is also key to understanding the role and meaning of emotions in everyday
life. The aim of this special issue is to examine the cognition–emotion interface through the lens of disrupted
emotion processing in alexithymia, which literally means having no words for one’s feelings. More specifically,
alexithymia is a multi-dimensional personality construct that has three major facets, (1) difficulty identifying
one’s feelings and distinguishing them from bodily sensations; (2) difficulty describing one’s feelings to others;
and (3) an externally oriented cognitive style, that is utilitarian and without including affective responses when
facing stressful situations (Taylor et al., 1997; 2016).
We begin by showing how emotion science has evolved in its understanding of personality traits, and then
highlight what can be learned about the cognition–emotion interface from experimental research on
alexithymia. In the second section, we situate the evolution of alexithymia research in the historical context of
psychosomatic medicine and overview the early research on the construct. In the third section, we provide a
review of the papers that are part of this special issue and their contributions to both the literature on
alexithymia and to understanding the cognition–emotion interface. In the final section, we highlight
dissociations in emotion processes that were revealed by the papers in this issue, and discuss the ways in which
the heterogeneity of functioning in alexithymia can inform future studies and theory about the cognition–
emotion interface.

1. Personality and the cognition–emotion interface
Emotion psychology has evolved considerably in explaining the role of personality traits in emotion processing
(Kuppens et al., 2009). Initially, personality theories of emotion focused on traits reflecting general tendencies to
experience certain emotions with higher or lower intensity and/or frequency. This approach obscured the
emotional processes underlying the trait(s) because each trait is more likely to manifest in situationally specific
ways (Mischel & Shoda, 1998). Current perspectives adopt an explicit interactionist framework, which assumes
that individual differences in emotional responses are explained by the concomitant effects of the person
(including his/her antecedents or history), the situation (including its novelty or controllability) and time
(including updating as a function of changes in both context and person) (Kuppens et al., 2009). One important
goal of this approach is therefore to identify the conditions under which individuals with higher scores on a
specific trait like alexithymia evidence modulations in their emotional responses.

The goal of identifying conditions where alexithymia results in modulated emotional response fits perfectly with
a process-oriented approach that has recently been developed in personality psychology (Quirin et al., 2020;
Robinson et al., 2019). In the Dynamics of Personality Approach (DPA), Quirin et al. (2020) emphasise the need
for investigating personality processes in an integrated manner, involving large classes of psychological functions
that include cognitive and emotional dimensions. DPA models involve objective measures explaining how
different functions interact for producing cognition, emotions and behaviours. Following the perspective
developed by Shoda and Mischel (2000), these new approaches contend that within-person variations across
different types of stimuli (e.g. emotional and neutral) are essential for understanding information processing
(Quirin et al., 2020; Robinson et al., 2019). Furthermore, a central aspect is that mechanisms involved in
personality traits can be modelled through the use of cognitive and behavioural tasks that directly investigate
processes such as attention, perception, appraisals, cognitive control or behaviours (Robinson et al., 2019).
These new approaches integrate the descriptive richness of the trait perspective with the explanatory power of
process-oriented models. The goal is to capture personality tendencies in vivo together with high degrees of
experimental control to provide explanatory frameworks of the personality process (Baumert et al., 2017).
The field of cognition and emotion is also essential in illuminating and empirically validating the clinical
significance of emotion. Perhaps most important is the translation of experimental paradigms from cognitive
psychology to study the processing of emotional information in clinical disorders (Oatley et al., 2011). A major
contribution of clinical cognition–emotion research has been the development of tasks that reveal and
characterise information processing of emotion, and specify the distinct features of those with emotional
disorders, particularly when salient material is applied (Joormann, 2019).
The central aim of this special issue is to advance the scientific understanding of how alexithymia alters
emotional processing. To do so, cutting-edge studies are presented that employ novel empirical approaches to
characterise which processes of the cognition–emotion interface are crucially involved. Several papers
specifically examine information processing paradigms and sensitivity to salient material. The special issue
represents two particularly compelling shifts in this literature. First, these studies examine what can be learned
about the cognition–emotion interface from experimental research on alexithymia and in so doing, they
challenge alexithymia research on the very nature of the emotional response. From the early work in the 1970s,
the dominant perspective was to view alexithymia as an overall deficit of emotion processing (e.g. Sifneos et
al., 1977; Taylor, 2000). While this view is occasionally challenged by findings showing excessive emotional
responding, there is a lack of empirical research or integrative theory that intentionally distinguishes the
conditions and contexts under which different, nuanced responses occur. Moreover, these distinctions are of
critical importance for the cognition–emotion literature, illustrating previously overlooked nuances of emotional
responding and dysfunction, and potential dissociations in emotional responding that need clarification. These
clarifications are likely to have fundamental influences on the understanding of emotion processing. The papers
in this special issue give attention to specifically evaluating these distinctions.
A second substantial shift that this special issue reveals is the beneficial role of a facet level analysis toward
better understanding the nuances of alexithymia, and through it, the cognition–emotion interface. Although
most studies have examined alexithymia as a unitary construct (i.e. using the total score), recent studies have
given much more attention to evaluating the influence of individual facets of alexithymia through subscale
scores. Total scores remain preferred for clinical purposes (Reise et al., 2013). However, for research purposes,
considering facet scores allows clearer identification of which processes are particularly related to specific
alexithymia features, and thus, how those features might influence individual’s mental and somatic
vulnerabilities.
All except one of the empirical papers in this special issue adopted a facet-level analysis, and the review by
Luminet et al. (2021) combined a facet-level analysis with a process perspective. Their findings provide clear

support for important differential influences of the facets on specific processes, as well as indicating
dissociations in emotion processing effects in alexithymia. Thus, immersion in the theoretical and empirical
paradigms of cognition and emotion using such an approach can substantively broaden understanding of the
fundamental processes underlying alexithymia. Furthermore, these studies of alexithymia highlight the benefits
of process-level analyses in more generally understanding emotion processing, particularly in delineating when
and under what conditions (e.g. affective vs. non-affective) dissociations occur.
Although systematic research examining the cognition–emotion interface did not begin until the mid 1990s, the
foundations of alexithymia and the study of the clinical significance of emotion are rooted in earlier work. Yet, it
was not until the mid-1990s that validated assessment of alexithymia became broadly available. Thus, the two
fields evolved rapidly and in the same era. We next provide an overview of this historical context in alexithymia
to set the stage for understanding how the papers in this special issue fit within this context and how they
advance it.

2. Alexithymia research: from clinical observations to controlled experiments
The notion of alexithymia originates with the observation that people with specific somatic diseases were
unable to experience and identify their emotions as subjective feelings, had a lack of fantasies about feelings
and instinctual drives, and exhibited a preoccupation with external events (e.g. Groddeck, 1923;
Wittkower, 1938). These observations were the foundational steps of psychosomatic medicine. The 1940s'
ushered in more systematic emotional and cognitive observations of these individuals, with the basis for somatic
disease attributed to unconscious psychological conflicts (Alexander, 1950) or stunted development of
personality and symbolic expression (Ruesch, 1948). MacLean (1949) proposed psychosomatic illnesses occur
through physiological stress resulting from deficits in verbal emotion expression. Subsequent study further
described psychosomatic patients as lacking introspection and fantasies (Horney, 1952; Kelman, 1952), with a
utilitarian, concrete way of thinking (i.e. “pensée opératoire”; Marty & de M’Uzan, 1963). Overall, these clinical
reports indicated a pattern of symptoms including disturbed verbal and symbolic emotion expression, low
imaginative ability, and a tendency toward solving stressful situations by physical action instead of
mentalization. In the early 1970s, Nemiah and Sifneos (1970) systematized these observations and drew direct
links between difficulty perceiving, understanding, describing and expressing feelings and proneness for various
somatic diseases. A turning point came when Sifneos (1973) coined the term “alexithymia” and began testing its
validity and using methods for assessing its severity.
Most of the research in the following two decades focused on understanding somatic illness, and physiological
and behavioural responding during emotion, but progress was impaired by the lack of a reliable instrument to
assess alexithymia severity. By the mid-1990s, however, a first carefully researched instrument became available
that allowed valid assessment of alexithymia, which is now the most widely used assessment scale (TAS-20;
Bagby et al., 1994a, 1994b; see Luminet et al., 2021, this issue, for a review of the current knowledge regarding
TAS-20 validity). The initial research on alexithymia specifically examined the relationship of alexithymia with
somatic illness (e.g. Parker et al., 1993a; Schmidt et al., 1993), suggesting vulnerability to illness in alexithymia
through deficits in the cognitive processing of emotions (Taylor, 2000; Taylor et al., 1997) and the arrested
development of affective regulation and interpersonal outcomes (e.g. Krystal, 1988). Other studies examined
dissociation (i.e. “decoupling”) of physiological from cognitive-experiential components of emotional responses
(e.g. Papciak et al., 1985), neurobiological bases of alexithymia (e.g. Hoppe & Bogen, 1977; Lane et al., 1998),
and interventions aimed at reducing alexithymia (e.g. Beresnevaite, 2000).
Although there were attempts in early alexithymia research to address the cognition–emotion interface (Mann
et al., 1994; Parker et al., 1993a, Parker et al., 1993b), the studies were limited by small samples and the lack of
a valid alexithymia assessment instrument. In 1997, Taylor et al. highlighted the need for a shift towards studies

examining the cognition–emotion interface in order to fully understand the underlying mechanisms involved in
high alexithymia scores: “Investigations that systematically evaluate differences in attention, retrieval,
recognition, and recall of emotional and non-emotional stimuli have the potential to delineate more clearly the
mechanisms underlying failures in affect regulation” (p. 268). By definition, each facet of alexithymia
characterises disturbance of the interaction between cognitive and emotional processes. Nevertheless, it is only
in the last 25 years (1995–2020) that more systematic research, using methods and tools originating in cognitive
psychology, has begun to elucidate the specific pattern of impairments associated with alexithymia.
This new line of research has examined the types of processes and the degree of deficits in the processing and
regulation of emotions associated with alexithymia severity. Those data helped to reveal the complex (and
possibly causal) links between mechanisms underlying the central facets of alexithymia and subsequent negative
mental and physical health outcomes. They also contributed to defining some of the specific circumstances in
which the impairments happen. For instance, studies revealed that people scoring higher on alexithymia exhibit
emotion processing deficits particularly when task difficulty is increased, such as under short time constraints or
degraded stimulus quality (e.g. Ihme et al., 2014a, 2014b; Kätsyri et al., 2008; Prkachin et al., 2009). Deficits
might also be dependent on the type of material used. If we consider the ability to detect, identify and recognise
emotions in oneself and others, deficits in alexithymia mainly occur for negative states such as anger, sadness or
fear (Luminet & Zamariola, 2018). Yet, the specific papers included in this special issue, which we overview next,
advance knowledge and add compelling new nuances to our understanding of the circumstances and possible
mechanisms involved in alterations of the cognition–emotion interface in alexithymia.

3. Overview of the special issue
Luminet et al. (2021): The special issue begins with a review of the empirical research in alexithymia that directly
addresses the cognition–emotion interface across the domains of attention, appraisals, memory, language and
behaviours (Luminet et al., 2021). The paper importantly and uniquely analysed the literature towards
identifying and distinguishing specific patterns of deficits in alexithymia, in contrast with findings of excessive
responding, which they dubbed “over-responding”, together with delineating the specificity of the effects as a
function of the type of material, and the context involved (i.e. affective vs. non-affective). Although there was a
primary pattern of deficits in processing across domains, over-responding was also frequently found, with a
particularly striking predominance in the domain of behaviours. These patterns were further evaluated relative
to specific alexithymia facets, wherever a facet-level analysis was available, providing a clearer and more
nuanced picture of what to expect in emotion processing studies in alexithymia.
Importantly, the facet “externally oriented thinking” was consistently linked to deficits, while the facets
“difficulty identifying feelings” and “difficulty describing feelings” were more typically linked to over-responding,
sometimes even to beneficial over-responding. Furthermore, these patterns of deficits and over-responding
were not limited to emotive contexts and materials but were found also for some neutral contexts and
materials. Finally, the paper discusses how the preponderance of the findings fit with several contemporary
emotion theories, indicating that impaired or biased attentional processing and cognitive control, during both
early and late processing, along with impaired emotion schemas, contribute to downstream effects on appraisal,
memory, language and behaviours. This framing was used to show how future alexithymia and emotion
research can guide each other, and how clinical interventions in alexithymia might be informed by cognitive
findings.
Panayiotou et al. (2021): The second paper of the special issue is a review of disruptions of physiological
reactivity and emotion processing in alexithymia, which contextualised the findings in the attention domain.
Panayiotou et al. (2021) draw on a selective literature review of valence, arousal, attention, memory, executive
control and interoception to evaluate the inflexibility of emotion regulation as a catalyst for elevating allostatic

load (McEwen, 1998). Specifically, maladaptive emotion regulation is conceived to lead to frequent stress,
inadequate reactivity, failed shutdown and failed habituation, which can ultimately result in physical and mental
illness. They advocate for alexithymia investigations that extend beyond simple reactivity to emotional stimuli,
proposing instead a dynamic-phasic model of emotion regulation focused on five stages of processing
(anticipation, response, recovery, habituation and rest), toward evaluating emotion regulation flexibility and its
role in alexithymia.
Notably, in considering physiological reactions, disruptions at the anticipation and response stages of emotional
processing were proposed to correspond to alexithymia-related dysfunction in attentional deployment. In
support of the proposal, electrophysiological evidence was presented indicating reduced early processing of
emotional material in alexithymia, suggestive of dysfunctional attentional engagement and attentional control
that underpin slow or inadequate recovery from emotional stressors. Although this important review did not
consider alexithymia facets, the proposal offered is nevertheless fitting with the other review paper in this issue
(Luminet et al., 2021), which consistently showed attention and appraisal deficits, with “externally oriented
thinking” as the primary facet associated with these deficits.
Larwood et al. (2021): In their paper, Larwood et al. (2021) examined the influence of alexithymia on ratings of
intensity and valence for a series of musical excerpts designed to represent anger, fear, joy, sadness and
tenderness. This paper thus addresses appraisals processes, which is the act of subjectively evaluating stimuli or
situations and is central to the generation of emotional feeling states in response to provocative stimuli (e.g.
Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1986). Appraisals can take multiple forms, but in alexithymia, valence has
been the focus of study to date (see Luminet et al., 2021). The results of Larwood et al. (2021) showed that
participants with higher alexithymia rated pieces depicting negative emotions as more neutral than did
participants with lower alexithymia. In contrast, no influence of alexithymia was found when pieces depicted
positive emotions. These results fit with studies evaluating the recognition of non-verbal emotions (i.e. auditory
vocalizations, such as laughs or cries), in which alexithymia was related to reduced accuracy for negative, but not
positive stimuli (Bayot et al., 2014).
Moreover, Larwood and colleagues also found that participants with higher alexithymia rated more extreme
emotions (i.e. anger and fear) as less intense than did low alexithymia scorers. Yet, they rated less extreme
emotions (i.e. sadness) as more intense than did those with low alexithymia. These results highlight an overall
blunting effect of alexithymia on the appraisal of negative stimuli, as well as an inability to distinguish among
emotional states that vary in terms of intensity. This is consistent with the theory that alexithymia-related
deficits in responding to emotion are due, at least in part, to poor evaluation of stimulus valence or intensity
resulting from poor early processing for stimuli that have a high demand for processing resources (Luminet et
al., 2021; Panayiotou et al., 2021). By investigating emotional responses to music, the study by Larwood and
colleagues represents an important extension of the literature examining appraisal processes in alexithymia,
which has tended to focus only on emotional responses to personally experienced events (e.g. Luminet et
al., 2000) or to visually presented affective words or images (e.g. Aaron et al., 2018; Koven, 2014; Luminet et
al., 2004).
Given the evidence of poorer emotional awareness and differentiation (da Silva et al., 2017) and less welldeveloped emotion schemas (e.g. Luminet et al., 2006; Lundh et al., 2002; Vermeulen et al., 2006), it is not
altogether surprising that people with higher alexithymia scores would be less likely to benefit from the typical
salience effects of emotion, where attention is captured and directed toward emotive content (e.g. Yiend, 2010).
It is well-understood that memory is assisted by these salience effects (e.g. Mather & Sutherland, 2011; Nielson
& Correro, 2017). As such, we might expect that memory deficits would be common in those with higher
alexithymia, at least in emotive contexts. While literature examining memory in alexithymia has grown quickly in
recent years, there is a lack of study of the intersection of these processes that would better characterise the

contexts and sources of memory deficits in alexithymia. The next three papers that examine memory processes
answer these important gaps in current knowledge.
Correro et al. (2021): In their paper, Correro et al. (2021) examined episodic memory (i.e. immediate and
delayed recall for stories and words) and executive functioning (i.e. cognitive control, complex attention) in
three independent, large sample cross-sectional studies. They furthermore explicitly examined memory using
neutral rather than emotive memoranda, hypothesising that with strong statistical power, subtler general
relationships between alexithymia and memory might be apparent. Contrary to Larwood et al. (2021), who only
examined total alexithymia scores, this paper, together with all the subsequent papers, also include an analysis
at the facet level of alexithymia. The paper by Correro and colleagues provides compelling evidence about the
cognition–emotion interface on three fronts. First, it importantly revealed that alexithymia contributes
to general cognitive deficits, particularly those associated with aging. Second, it extended the existing literature
to affirm that alexithymia contributes substantively to memory deficits, even for neutral material or contexts,
including after delayed retention testing, which has not been well-studied so far. Finally, this study highlighted
distinct contributions of the alexithymia factors “difficulty identifying feelings” and “externally oriented
thinking” in memory functioning.
Correro et al. (2021) found that “difficulty identifying feelings” was linked to executive functioning deficits,
suggesting reduced processing resources available for complex tasks in alexithymia. Executive functioning is
fundamentally important to tracking relevant stimuli, ignoring irrelevant stimuli, inhibiting unwanted responses,
and correcting errors. Thus, the role of “difficulty identifying feelings” in executive functioning reinforces that
alexithymia alters early stimulus processing, including attention and appraisal, which can produce downstream
effects on cognition, such as memory and behaviour, even in neutral contexts. This is consistent with the
expectations posed by both Panayiotou et al. (2021) and Luminet et al. (2021). Indeed, Correro et al. (2021)
found “externally oriented thinking” was responsible for memory deficits, due to reduced meaningfulness or
salience of important memoranda (i.e. “signal”) relative to foils (i.e.“noise”), and that poor executive functioning
exacerbated this effect in older adults. Thus, the authors concluded that “externally oriented thinking” reduces
the ability to use internal cognitive control processes that can facilitate effective memory storage and access
(Dressaire et al., 2015). This poor internal monitoring results in risks for generally poorer cognitive functioning in
older age.
Vermeulen (2021): Previous literature on memory and alexithymia has focused on long-term memory (LTM)
abilities (albeit almost exclusively with short retention delays), showing that retrieval is hampered in high
alexithymia when the to-be-remembered stimuli or the events are emotional (e.g. Vermeulen et al., 2018).
While LTM also plays a central role in short-term memory (STM) performance, very few studies have examined
STM (i.e. working memory) in alexithymia (DiStefano & Koven, 2012; Takahashi et al., 2015). In his paper for this
special issue, Vermeulen (2021) extends prior investigations of STM for affective and neutral words by
contrasting the effects of blocked- (Study 1; only positive, negative, or neutral stimuli) and mixed-valence
memoranda (Study 2; positive frequent or rare, negative frequent or rare) in alexithymia.
The results showed that alexithymia was related to a deficit for short-term memory of words, but only in the
blocked condition where lists included only one category of words (Study 1). Deficits were associated with
“externally oriented thinking” for all word categories; for positive words, deficits were also associated with
“difficulty describing feelings”. It was suggested that the poorly integrated emotion schemas in alexithymia
contribute to reducing access to emotion categories, and reducing the “richness” of emotion material in
particular. The results fit well with the hypothesis that those with higher alexithymia have difficulty linking
symbolic and sub-symbolic representations of their past (Bucci, 1997; Taylor & Bagby, 2004), as well as with the
recent attention-appraisal model that attributes alexithymia specifically to deficits of attention (“externally

oriented thinking”) and appraisal (“difficulty identifying feelings, externally oriented thinking”) in emotion
processing (Preece et al., 2017).
Ridout et al. (2021). Nearly all memory studies in alexithymia have examined verbal memoranda. In contrast,
Ridout et al. (2021) importantly extend the literature by examining the influence of alexithymia on memory for
socially relevant non-verbal stimuli, including faces (Study 1) and social interactions (Study 2). In Study 1, their
findings showed that “difficulty describing feelings” contributed to poorer recognition memory for emotional
faces. Moreover, the deficits were particularly strong when faces exhibited anger. This memory deficit, related
to “difficulty describing feelings”, was also apparent in a prior study with face stimuli (Donges & Suslow, 2015)
and is consistent with other studies that highlight a specific deficit in alexithymia for detecting and attending to
anger and, more generally, threat-related information (e.g. Fujiwara, 2018; Luminet et al., 2011; Vermeulen et
al., 2006, 2008).
In Study 2, Ridout and colleagues (2021) found that “difficulty identifying feelings” was related to poorer
memory for emotional social interactions, particularly for interactions featuring anger and happiness. However,
“difficulty identifying feelings” was also related to better familiarity for neutral interactions. Similar results were
shown with words by Dressaire et al. (2015). However, this finding differs from Correro et al. (2021), where
neutral memory deficits attributed to “externally oriented thinking” were worsened in those with high “difficulty
identifying feelings”. Importantly, Correro and colleagues used an exclusively neutral context. In contrast,
participants in Ridout et al. evaluated emotive and neutral social interactions; the neutral interactions were
likely easier to appraise, relative to the emotive interactions. Thus, “difficulty identifying feelings”
might facilitate processing, if the context, even a neutral context, allows for less difficult appraisal (Luminet et
al., 2021; Preece et al., 2017).
Taken together, these three memory papers suggested that alexithymia impairs memory in both short-term and
long-term forms, although attention and appraisal likely contribute significantly to the findings and to the facet
responsible for those effects. Moreover, the three alexithymia factors were involved in memory deficits through
different underlying processes. “Difficulty identifying feelings” was related to executive functions deficits that
can be linked with decreased processing resources and greater difficulty mobilising them (Correro et al., 2021).
It was also related to deficits in memory for social interactions, notably those involving anger. “Difficulty
describing feelings” was also related to deficits in memory involving anger, but in relation to face processing
(Ridout et al., 2021).
The implications of these results are important because an anger display is a central component of threat, which
activates the search for urgent responses in order to avoid danger. Specific deficits for anger processing suggest
that alexithymia leads to reduced attention and reactivity when situations require particularly fast responses
(see Vermeulen et al., 2006 for an extended discussion of the role of anger deficits in alexithymia). “Difficulty
describing feelings” was also related to decreased STM that was linked to poorly integrated cognitive schemata
(Vermeulen, 2021). Finally, in addition to decreased STM, “externally oriented thinking” was related to
decreased internal monitoring and awareness that reduces the ability to extract and prioritise meaningful or
salient information from extraneous and inaccurate information (Correro et al., 2021).
Verbal and non-verbal language allows people to communicate inner thoughts and feelings and to understand
the utterances of others, which is central to social life. Studies have explored language expression in alexithymia,
finding consistent deficits in alexithymia, typified by reduced complexity, openness and emotional content (see
Luminet et al., 2021; Welding & Samur, 2018), which are linked to deficits of empathy (Grynberg et al., 2018)
and mentalizing affect (Fonagy et al., 2002). Such findings suggest that language comprehension would also
suffer from deficits in alexithymia. However, there is a paucity of studies specifically examining language
comprehension abilities in alexithymia, except as it pertains to attention (e.g. Stroop, priming; see Welding &

Samur, 2018). Fortunately, two papers that contributed to this special issue have directly addressed language
comprehension in alexithymia.
Samur et al. (2021): In their paper, Samur et al. (2021) conducted both a large-cohort online study and a smaller
laboratory study to measure the influence of contextual support on language comprehension, as a function of
narrative engagement in alexithymia. Participants read fictional narratives written from either first-person or a
third-person perspective. First-person perspectives tend to better support and engage listeners, purportedly
because they support “mental transportation”, helping the person to better transcend the here and now and
project themselves into distant times and places (Macrae et al., 2014), which contributes social-cognitive skills
(Mar & Oatley, 2008). Their results showed poorer narrative engagement in alexithymia (both for the total score
and for a poor fantasy life or fantasising facet1). Moreover, they found that only those scoring low on
alexithymia were able to benefit from first-person narratives to enhance engagement; those scoring high on
alexithymia via the fantasising facet had no difference in engagement based on the narrator perspective. These
findings compellingly suggest a deficit of perspective-taking in alexithymia consistent with reduced narrative
engagement, which is likely due to poorer mental imagery (van der Velde et al., 2013) and poor development of
emotion schemas (Hoemann & Feldman Barrett, 2019) and empathy (Grynberg et al., 2018).
Jakobson and Pearson (2021): The paper by Jakobson and Pearson (2021) examined whether the mentalizing
abilities required to understand the implicit intentions of a speaker are influenced by alexithymia. Participants
watched video-taped vignettes of a speaker making sincere or insincere statements in response to a question
posed by an interviewer. Participants were asked to judge whether the statements were meant to be taken
literally or sarcastically (in jest) or as a “fib” (i.e. a trivial lie). These were either positive (e.g. compliments) or
negative (e.g. criticisms). For each statement, viewers were given either no added context, where only nonverbal cues (e.g. facial expressions, voice, body language) could be used to discern the speaker’s intentions, or
they were given added verbal context cues. These verbal cues, which were provided in half the videos, were
short vignette segments that preceded the exchange with the interviewer, where the speaker communicated
their true intentions to a third person. Thus, when watching the vignette, the participant had insight into the
speaker’s true intention that did not have to be surmised from behavioural cues alone. The analyses controlled
for verbal intelligence and sex. The results showed that alexithymia did not impair the accuracy of discerning the
speaker’s intent. Indeed, better accuracy was associated with “difficulty describing feelings”, perhaps because
thresholds for excitation and sensation are typically lower in alexithymia (Liss et al., 2008), which may have
made these vignettes particularly engaging to those with alexithymia. The authors suggested that “difficulty
describing feelings” would instead impair performance for emotionally charged vignettes. Importantly,
“difficulty identifying feelings” resulted in slower decision-making about speaker intentions when relying on
non-verbal cues, which could hamper everyday social functioning.
Taken together, the two language papers in this special issue uniquely and crucially show that socio-emotional
interactions, including perspective-taking, emotional empathy, imagery, and language comprehension may be
hampered by alexithymia. This is fitting with the suggestion that theory of mind, including making inferences
about others' states of mind, is impaired in alexithymia (Grynberg et al., 2018). They furthermore highlight that
analysis of the specific contributions of facets is important to revealing when and under what circumstances
alexithymia might influence social interactions. Specifically, these two unique studies suggest different roles in
language for each alexithymia facet.
“Difficulty identifying feelings” appears to hamper decision-making about others' communications (Jakobson &
Pearson, 2021), which is consistent with reduced capacity for and mobilisation of executive function resources
(e.g. Correro et al., 2021), which may be amplified in anger contexts (Ridout et al., 2021). “Difficulty describing
feelings” may be helpful to understanding others' communications when the context is unemotional, though it
may have the opposite effect under emotive conditions, perhaps particularly in anger or other threat contexts

(e.g. Ridout et al., 2021). Finally, fantasising (closely linked to “externally oriented thinking”) contributes to
deficits in perspective-taking, perhaps due to poor empathy (Grynberg et al., 2018), emotion schemas
(Hoemann & Feldman Barrett, 2019) and internal monitoring and extraction of meaningful information from the
environment (Correro et al., 2021). Notably, the findings of these studies also strongly suggest the importance of
the further study of language comprehension in social situations in alexithymia and point to the need for a more
nuanced evaluation of fantasising and emotional reactivity to better interpret these effects (Jakobson &
Pearson, 2021).
Gvirts and Dery (2021): The final paper, by Gvirts and Dery (2021), provides new perspectives on the impact of
alexithymia on social alignment. Social alignment theory suggests that people create connectedness, closeness
and likability by creating alliances with other members of a group through thoughts, emotions and behaviours
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2019). Because of poor communication skills, those with higher alexithymia scores would
exhibit reduced social alignment. To evaluate this hypothesis, participants were randomly assigned to play an
online game with a group of seven other players. Unbeknownst to participants, these “players” were either
other humans, or they were bots programmed to behave more rationally than humans. The game used five
cards with animal images, each with a different point value. These specific values for each card differed between
players and players only knew their own valuations. The goal of the game, involving 10 rounds, was to shift
choices to reach a group consensus of card choice, before time expired. During the rounds, players could see the
number of players who had chosen each card. Thus, to reach consensus, they had to actively shift their choice
until a consensus was reached. If no consensus was reached prior to the deadline, zero points were earned,
making consensus reaching valuable. It also required making choices that could reduce the individual points
earned by prioritising the card preferred by others. This “opposing alignment” is indicative of rational decisionmaking.
Gvirts and Dery (2021) found that higher “externally oriented thinking” scores predicted irrational decisions, but
for different underlying motives depending on the type of opponent. When playing with bots, those with high
“externally oriented thinking” exhibited heightened opposing alignment, where players inhibited personally
beneficial actions toward better promoting a consensus. It was suggested that this likely occurred because the
drive to avoid conflict was higher due to high harmony amongst other players. In contrast, during games against
humans, where consensus-building was less consistent, those with higher “externally oriented thinking”
exhibited less opposing alignment, instead of tending to prioritise personal gain. Social alignment has been
associated with reward (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2019). As such, Gvirts and Dery suggested that those with higher
“externally oriented thinking” are less reliant on reward sensations because they did not strive to prioritise
group harmony when playing against other imperfect consensus-builders. They did so only when consensus was
very high; not doing so would create high conflict and disrupt group harmony. Indeed “externally oriented
thinking” has been linked to poor perspective-taking (Grynberg et al., 2010), social detachment (Vanheule et
al., 2011) and various aspects of impaired cognitive processing (see Luminet et al., 2021). This study compellingly
contributes to our understanding of the social difficulties that have been reported experimentally, and observed
clinically, in those with high levels of alexithymia, such as impaired processing of the emotional states of others,
deficits in empathy and compromised pro-sociality (Grynberg et al., 2018).

4. Conclusions and new perspectives
An important finding across the papers of this special issue is the repeated observation of a lack of
correspondence amongst emotional responses in alexithymia. This lack of correspondence is first apparent
between processes, as well as amongst the alexithymia facets. In the review by Luminet et al. (2021) and across
multiple empirical papers in this special issue there was a strong dominance of emotion-related cognitive
deficits, particularly in memory and language, contrasting with an over-responding to emotion or threat in

behavioural responding. Impaired performance in the cognitive domain was associated with each of the
alexithymia facets, but dominantly so with “externally oriented thinking”. These effects have been linked to poor
internal monitoring and avoidance behaviours (see Luminet et al., 2021; Preece et al., 2017). In contrast,
“difficulty identifying feelings” was more often associated with an over-responding to emotion or threat (e.g.
Teten et al., 2008; Velotti et al., 2016), and together with “difficulty describing feelings”, was linked to the poor
appraisal of stimuli, cognitive control and evaluation of salience (see Luminet et al., 2021; Preece et al., 2017).
Thus, these studies collectively highlight that emotion processing is not homogeneous across processes. That is,
it is not represented by a continuous dimension where “more is better”. Instead, deviations in either direction
from typical may reflect the influence of distinct underlying cognitive mechanisms. Alexithymia research
exemplifies the opportunities available to better delineate and explain the foundations and mechanisms of
these deviations.
The lack of correspondence between emotion processes found in the special issue corresponds to a small
number of empirical studies that have simultaneously considered the three emotion components (physiological,
behaviour-expressive and cognitive-experiential). These studies show that in low alexithymia the three
components are positively associated, while in high alexithymia they are dissociated2 (Constantinou et al., 2014;
Pollatos & Gramann, 2011). Similarly, Peasley-Miklus et al. (2016) reported weaker physiological–
cognitive/experiential and behavioural–cognitive/experiential associations in higher alexithymia participants.
These responses contrast with a fuller, normal emotional experience that involves the activation of the three
emotional components.
Studies that have examined combinations of the three components together (e.g. multi-component studies)
show that in normative samples they are correlated, although not always strongly so (e.g. Bradley & Lang, 2000;
Cacioppo et al., 1992; Mauss et al., 2005). A central outcome is that emotional awareness is generated through
synchronisation amongst emotional components (Scherer, 2000, 2005; see also Grandjean et al., 2008), which
fits with models suggesting that alexithymia is related to emotion awareness deficits (three-process model,
Smith et al., 2018; see Luminet et al., 2021 for a discussion of the relevance of the model to account for
cognitive–emotional impairments in alexithymia). Furthermore, dissociated emotional components have been
demonstrated as a risk factor for long-term negative health outcomes (e.g. Myers, 2010; Schäflein et al., 2018),
providing a process explanation for the ubiquitous negative mental and physical health outcomes in alexithymia
(e.g. Morie & Ridout, 2018). Together, these findings illuminate the intersecting and situationally specific
relationships amongst emotional components and emphasise the value of multi-component studies for a fuller
understanding of the interface between cognition and emotion generally, and specifically in individual and
personality differences.
The papers on the special issue also provide valuable insights for future research on the cognition–emotion
interface. We briefly consider insights at three levels of analysis: extending the type of processes involved,
considering systematically neutral and emotive contexts together, and improving methodological condition. At
the process level, at least four papers in this special issue (Gvirts & Dery, 2021; Jakobson & Pearson, 2021;
Ridout et al., 2021; Samur et al., 2021) illustrate the richness of systematical investigations into interpersonal
and collective processes such as empathy, pro-social behaviours or norms adherence, clearly indicating these
processes have important influences on cognitive-emotion interactions beyond the intra-individual level. Studies
such as the one by Correro et al. (2021) furthermore highlight the importance of drawing better connections
amongst multiple processes, toward disentangling the effects of early processes (e.g. attention) on later
processes (e.g. memory and language). In addition, they suggest the value of better delineating relationships
between cognitive processes, such as executive functions, and personality characteristics, including and beyond
alexithymia.

At the context level, it is important to consider that the processing of neutral information is not simply a
baseline measure to compare with emotional stimuli. While studies of the cognition–emotion interface tend to
focus on processing during emotive contexts, the papers in this special issue show that neutral information is
not immune to the influence of individual differences, resulting in both deficits (e.g. Correro et al., 2021;
Vermeulen, 2021) and benefits (Ridout et al., 2021).
Finally, at the methodological level, the papers in this special issue demonstrate that the vast majority of studies
of the cognition–emotion interface in alexithymia are done cross-sectionally and in normative samples. These
papers highlight the need for a greater focus on longitudinal and experimental designs that allow for causal
interpretations regarding influences on the cognition–emotion interface. Regarding normative samples,
alexithymia is a stable personality trait, rather than simply a clinical categorisation (e.g. Luminet et al., 2001).
Thus, it is important to consider that studies of the cognition–emotion interface in alexithymia, including all of
the papers in this special issue, have almost exclusively employed normative rather than severe or clinical
samples. Moreover, each paper demonstrated significant cognitive and behavioural implications of alexithymia
without the aid of severe populations, and even extended beyond emotion processing into more general
cognitive processing. It would therefore be expected for such effects to be more exaggerated, and even more
important to address, in more severe alexithymia. This conclusion further implies that all studies of the
cognitive-emotion interface would directly benefit from a greater consideration of the contributions of
personality differences, alongside well-designed experimental methods, thereby allowing more thorough
explanatory frameworks.
In conclusion, thea studies that compose this special issue highlight that alexithymia influences several aspects
of how one perceives and responds to neutral and emotional situations and interacts with others in those
situations. From the introductive vignette presented by Luminet et al. (2021), we can highlight that scoring high
on alexithymia has multiple implications for daily life. A lack of variation in emotional responses, a scarcity of
experiencing pleasant feelings, and an attribution of personal reactions to external rather than internal
circumstances limits the extent and quality of their social network, increases the likelihood of somatic illnesses,
and restricts their inner world to purely factual concerns. These outcomes are broad and consequential for their
biological, psychological and social life. We expect that the findings presented in this special issue can help to
advance the design and targeting of both future cognition–emotion research, and the development of effective
interventions to improve emotion processing and reduce risk and manifestation of physical and emotional
illness.
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Notes

1 Poor fantasy life is assessed in some self-report scales such as the BVAQ (Bermond et al., 2015). It is closely
related to externally oriented thinking.
2 Dissociation across emotional components can take different forms. Specifically, there can be simultaneous
activation of one component while there is deactivation of another, or deactivation or activation of one
component, with no activation of other components.
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